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''Europe: 
Why  Social Democrats  Should Support a  New  Advance" 
There  is a double attraction in having been  invited to deliver this 
year's Rita Hinden  Memorial  Lecture.  It is an  honour  because  of the 
distinction of my  predecessors at this rostrum:  and  it is a pleasure because 
of the warmth  of commitment  which  Rita Hinden  brought  to the great causes 
with which  she was  selflessly associated.  I  begin my  remarks  this afternoon 
by  paying  tribute to her memory.  'Socialist Commentary',  so much  her creation, 
has  been  much  more  than a  friend,  valuable though  it has  been  as  such.  For 
20  years it has  been both a haven  and  a  rallying point, and  Labour  Party 
politics would  have  been  much  less sensible ru1d  informed without it. 
For  Rita Hind en,  libertaria!! social democracy,  to which  she  devoted a 
lifetime of service,  ~as closely,  indeed inextricably,  linked to European  union, 
for which  she  fought  no  less determinedly in her later years •.  I  believe 
that she was  right to see a  link between  them,  and  it is the nature of  ~at 
link that I  wm1t  to explore today.  Unlike  some  previous  lecturers in 
this series, however,  I  shall not concern myself primarily with the  fundamental 
moral  and  philosophical basis of social democracy.  Instead I  shall try 
~ 
to examine  a number  of pressing, practical questions  - questions which, 
I  believe,  require urgent  answers  if social democracy  is to remain  a viable 
politicai form  in the continent of its birth. 
l'v'hat  do  I  mean  by  social democracy  and  why  do  I  believe 
that its fate may  be  in balance?  The  term is, of course, 
both controversial and  imprecise.  Like  most  such  terms,  it 
/has been used J 
'  I  ........ ~  has  been  used  in a  wide  variety of ways  since it was  first  -~ 
coined,  and  is still subject  to  a  wide  variety of interpretations. 
But  I  do  not  think it would  be profitable to  embark  on  a  lengthy 
historical account  of  the way  in which it has  evolved since  the 
first mass  social democratic  party  grew  up  in  Germany  more  than 
seventy years  ago.  Nor  do  I  see  much  point  in engaging  in  an 
essentially semantic  exercise,  designed  to  defend  my 
.. 
interpretation of it against  possible  rivals.  I  merely assert that, 
for  me,  the  essence  of modern  social  democracy  lies  in  a  double 
commitment  to  individual  freedom  on  the  one  hand  and  to social 
justice on  the  other,  and  that  both halves  of that double 
commitment  should  count  equally. 
From  that  fundamental  principle  a  number  of conclusions 
fdllow.  It means  that social  democracy  rejects  the  assumptions 
and  consequences  of both  classical nineteenth-century  liberalism 
and  classical nineteenth-century Marxism.  Social  democrats  reject 
the  laisser-faire assumptions  that  the  market  always 
knows  best;  that state  intervention  i~ the  working  of  the  market 
is bound  to distort  the  proper allocation of resources  and .  .to 
invade  individual  rights;  and  that strong  government  is 
incompatible with  individual  freedom.  They  know  that,  in reality, 
a  strong,  and  (within  limits)  interventionist state is often 
the  guarantor  of personal  freedom,  and  that if the  market  is  left 
to its  own  devices  the  weak  are  likely  to _go  to  the wall.  They  also 
• 
reject  the  assumption  stemming  from  Marx  that social  justice and  true 
freedom  are  impossible  when  the  means  of production  are privately 
owned  - knowing  that,  in  reality,  complete  public  ownership  h8s 
invariably  been  accompanied  by  the  stifling of  individu2l  j~j ~  ~:ivc 
and  has  concentrated  power  in  the  hands. of  a  more  or  less 
oppressive state. 
..·A  men:  positive :f"" 
.'-. 
A'rnore ·positive conclusion  can  be  drawn  as  well.  For Marxists 
and  laisser-faire liberals alike,  the  modern  mixed  economy  -
an  economy,  that is,  in which  the  state intervenes  actively and 
continuously  to redress  the  balance  of  the  market  in  favour  of 
the weak,  but  in which  a  stl'ong  and  desirably profitable private 
sector exists  side  by  side with  the  public  sector - is  an 
intellectual  and  emotional  affront.  If the  intellectual 
premises  of either Marxism  or  laisser-faire liberalism were  valid, 
the  mixed  economy  could  hard~ly exist,  except  perhaps  in  a  highly 
transient  and  unstable  form.  The  fact  is  that  for  the  last 
thirty years  it has  not  only  existed throughout much  of  the 
developed  world, .but  for  by  far  the  greater part of the  time 
provided  the  most  sustained period-of wealth  and welfare  growth 
the world  has  ever  seen.  For  social  democrats  the  mixed  economy 
is positively desirable  - not  as  a  transition  to  a  complete 
theoretical  socialism but  as  a  continuing  and  desirable  framework 
for  social action  and  political argument.  Social  democrats 
know,  of course,  that  no  patticul~i mix  is perfect,  and  that,  even 
•  in  the  most  advanced  and  prosperous  mixed  economies,  mankind's 
unending·battle  against  inj~stice and  avoidable  suffering still 
has  to  be  fought.  This  does·  not  surprise  them,  for  they also 
know  that perfection is  impossible  outside Utopia,  and  that  the 
messianic  search  for  Utopias  led more  often  to  bloodshed  and 
tyrann~ than  to  advances  in welfare.  And  they  know,  too,  that 
the  mixed  economy  off_ers  as  good  .-a  de fence  ·  as~  mankind  has  yet 
devised  against  the  arrogance  of  powe~ and  that it is  only  in  a 
.) 
m~xed economy  that  their double  commitment  to  freedom  and  justice 
can  be  realised  in practice. 
/This,  I  believe, This,  I  believe,  is  wh~re the  continuing  link between 
social  democracy  and  European  union  is  to be  found.  The  history 
of Western  Europe  since  the  war  has  been  characterised above  all 
by  the  triumph  of social democracy  in  the  sense  used  here  -. 
even  in countries where  social  democrats  have  not  held  power 
or where  the  values  of social  democracy  are  not  promu~ted by 
explicitly social  democratic  forces.  All  the  Member  States  of the 
Community  are  mixed  economies.  All  have  sizeable public sectcrs, 
coexisting with  the private sector.  All  practice  some  variety 
or other of more  or  less  flexible  economic  planning.  None  gives 
a  free  rein  to market  forces,  yet  in all the  need  to control  the 
operation of the market  in  the  interests  of  society  as  a  whole  is 
balanced against  the  need  to allow  the  greatest possible  freedom 
of choice  to  the  individual  consumer.  All  are welfare states, 
allocating  a  significantly higher proportion of their gross 
national  products  to  social welfare  than  is  the  case  L1  most  of 
the  rest of the  world.  And  all are,  at  the  same  time,  open 
societies with  free  institutions. 
What  is  also significant  is  that  the  same  approach  pref'ail.s 
at  the  c6mmunity  level  as  wei~.  The  Coal  and  Steel  Community  ~~ 
the  early  'fifties  - the  foundation  on  which  the  present 
.. 
Community  was  built  - was  not  e~plicitly social-democratic  in 
form,  but it was  certainly social-democratic  in spirit.  Its 
object ~as to create  a  common  market  in  coal  and  steel products, 
and  in so  doing,  to prevent  the  re-emergence  of the  cartels  ~hich 
dominated  both  industries  before  the  war.  But  the  11igh  Authority 
which  managed  the  Community's  policies was  a  highly  intcrvc~:ic~ist 
body,  and  had  at its disposal  a  wide  range  of  instrumen..:..'.  ";' 
which  to make  its interventions  bite  - instruments  which  ~ .  ~ 
inherited by  the  Commission  when  the  r~~,  ~nd Str  ~  Commun~t · 
/merged merged  with  the  Economic  Community.  The  Rome  Treaty, 
it is true,  gave  more  emphasis  to  free  competition;  and  in· its 
early years  the  Economic  Community  concentrated  on  removing 
trade barriers  and  ensuring  the  freest possible  exchange  of  goods 
and  services.  Since  the  early  'seventies,  thol<rever ·,  the  Community 
has  adopted  an  increasingly  interventionist  stance  on  a  whole 
range  of  industrial problems,  and  has  also devoted  increasing 
attention,  although not  yet  enough  money,  to  the 
redistribution of resources  in  favour  of  the  weaker  regions  and 
disadvantaged social  groups  through  the  Regional  and  Social 
funds. 
This  movement  to social  democracy  has  over  a  short 
now 
generation  assumed  a  familiarity  w~ich/makes its weaknesses  more 
apparent  than  its underlying virtues.  And  indeed  the  economic 
strains  and  checks  of the  past  5  years  have  exposed  weaknesses  which 
~ere not  apparent  in  the  heady  rush  to prosperity of  the 
'sixties.  Even  with  the  additional  dangers  and  difficulties 
of  today  the  advance  over  a  generation  has  been  immense.  Forty  .. 
years  ago  thiS month,  what  was  the  scene?  Gennan  Nazism  & Ttal:lan 'Fascism 
. 
were  each  in  the  plenitude  of  their powers  and  were  about  to 
cement  their brutal  partnership with Hitler's visit to  Rome. 
~  ' 
The  Spanish Republic  was  near to defeat.  L€on  Blum  had  just 
lost power  in  France,  and  Neville  Chamb~rlain enjoyed 
an  apparently unchallengeable majority 
/in the -----~-------------------~~-~--- ~---~~~~-- ~ 
in  the  British House  of Commons.  Only  a  few  disparate  islands 
of social democracy  stood out::  in New  Zealand  and  Scandinaviu. 
In  the  United States,  the  New  Deal  had lit a  beacon  for  the 
democratic  left throughout  the  world.  But  in Europe,  darkness 
seemed  to  be  closing  in.  The  survival  of  free  institutions 
seemed  to be  in  doubt;  to many  of  the  ,most 
intelligent  ·  of  my  own  generation  the  only  choice  seemed  to  lie 
between--.a. t.otali  tarianism of  the  Right  and  a  totalitarianism of 
the  Left.  Few  would  have  dared  to  predict  that,  only  a  Jecadc 
later,  Western  Europe  would  have  come  through  c~tastropHe and  was  on 
the:··threshold  o.£  a  generation  of burgeoning prosperity  and 
_  .. 
increasingly secure peace;  fewer  s!ill would  have  guessed  thet, 
during  that  generation,  social  democracy  would  become  the 
Western  European  norm. 
The  European  Community  has  been  the  buttressing  accompaniment 
rather  than  the  trigger of this  massive  achievement.  The  trigger 
was  a  combination  of American  generosity,  not  entirely  withou~ 
self-interest but  of  an  unusually  far-sighted nature,  which 
is  perhaps  the  best  recipe  for  constructive  statesman~ip, and 
of determined  and  courageous  leadership  by  a  handful  of 
remarkable  European  politicians.  I,do,  however,  believe 
that  the  future  preservation  of this  ~chievement depends  on 
the  underpinning  and  strengthening  of tbe  Community.  For  the 
triump~ of social  democracy has been  built. on  success  - and, 
more  particularly on  a  combination  of  the  abandonment  of narrow 
nationalism and  the  practical vindication  of the  ideas  of  Keynes 
by  the  war-time  needs  of America  and  the  post-war  needs  of 
to  recall  the 
Europe.  No  one  needed ;recipe  of one  of his  more  famo~.s  r<,,~-,,.:~:-.. 
"to bury  bank notes  in  disused  coal-mines  and  leave it tv  >  ·, ·>c 
enterprise  to  dig  them  up"  because  the  demands  o"- the  war  ,_-.:  · L:· 
/US  economy ~ 
-,,.  US  economy  and·of  the  need  for post-war  reconstruction  on  a  devasta-
ted European  continent provided  less  contrived  remedies.  The 
Keynesian  techniques  also made  it possible  for  the state  to  manage 
the  economy  at  arm's  length,  without  recourse  to  the  bureaucratic 
paraphernalia of quotas  and physical  controls.  Most  of  the 
advantages  of the free market  and  the price mechanism  could be 
enjoyed while  avoiding  the waste  and  suffering which  had 
characterised them  in  the past.  And  the  net  result was  the 
most  rapid  and  sustained increase  in  living standards  - both 
private  and  collective - which  this  continent  has  ever  known. 
There  was  a  comparable  release  of energies  and  creation.of wealth 
in post-Civil War  Americ~, but  then  it was  accompanied  by 
far  more  harshness  of  experience  and  inequality of  reward. 
Now,  however,  there  are  signs  that  at  any  rate,  at  the 
level  of  the  medium-sized  European  nation state  - the  Keynesian 
Revolution  has  run  it  course.  Six  and  a  half million people 
are  now  out  of  work  in  the  nine  Member  States  of  the  European 
Community.  In  the next  seven  yeats~ nine million more  young 
people  are  expected  to  join the  Community's  labour  force  • 
than  old  people  are  expected  to  leave  it.  There  is  no 
immediate  prospect  of  a  majb~ upturn.  By  all the  rules  of 
Keynesian  economic  manag~ment_,  this  would  be  the  time  to  pump 
extra.purchasing power  into  the  economy,  to stimulate  demand  and 
bring _down  unemployment.  Yet  no  Member  State of  the  Community 
dares  to  do  this  - not  because  their  Governments  are  indifferent 
to  the  human  and  social  costs  of  high  unemployment,  but  because 
~he familiar  instruments  of  navigation  no  longer  chart  our way 
in  the  seas  of the  late  'seventies.  It is  as  though  we  hid 
gone  into  some strange limbo  in  which  the  compass  and  the  sextant 
no  longer work. 
I  In  countries In countries with  weak  currencies,  Governments  are deterred 
from  taking action to  expand  the  economy  by  fear  of  the  consequenc;r 
for  inflation and the  exchange  rate.  They  know  that  the  immediate 
consequence  of an  increase  in  the  budget  deficit or  the  money 
supply  is  likely to  be  a  fall  in  the  exchange  rate:  and 
that  the  consequences  of  a  fall  in  the  exchange  rate will 
include  an  increase  in  the  rate of  inflation,  a  stimulus  to 
inflationary expectations,  damage  to  the  chances  of stable wage 
bargaining  and  damage  to both  consumer  and  business  confidence. 
So  they sit tight:  and  in  the  circumstances it is difficult  to 
see  that  they have  much  altern~tive. 
At  first sight it might  be  thought  that  the Member  States 
with strong  economies  should  therefore  assume  responsibility 
for pulling  the  Community  out  of  the  recession.  But  on  closer 
investigation,  it turns  out  that  this  is  not  possible either. 
For  the  countries  with  strong  currencies  are  heavily dependent 
on  exports,  with  the  result  that  their  levels  of employment 
and  investment  are  determined  as  much  by  the  state of demand 
in  the  countries  to  which  they sell their goods  as  by  the  ~ 
state of demand  within  their  own  frontiers.  German  industrialists 
.  . 
will not  be  inclined  to  invest  in  new  plant  or machinery, 
or  take  on  extra  workers,~mercly becauie  the  German  Government 
increases  public  spending  or  relaxes  credit conditions.  They 
want  to  know  what  is  going  to  happen  outside  Germany,  in  the 
countries  which  buy  German  goods.  Thus,  it is  argued,  even  in 
Germany,  Keynesian  pump  priming  is  more  likely to  produce  harmful 
effects  on  prices  than  beneficial effects  on  output  and  jobs. 
/This  is not  to  say --------------~ 
This  is not  :.t_o  say  that  the  classic  Keynesian  instruments 
no  longer work  at all.  It is  to say that  they no  longer work 
in the  member  states of a  Community  characterised by  high  trade 
interdependence  and with highly  voJ ~tile exchange  rates.  After 
all,  the  central premise  of Keynes'  theory was  that  Governments 
could  determine  the  level of effective demand  for  the 
goods  produced by their own  nationals.  Forty years  ago,  they  could. 
They  can  even  today,  in  a  continental-scale  economy  like  that 
of the  United  States  - though  even  here  there  are  now  difficulties. 
But  in  the  much  smaller nation states of Western  Europe,  they 
cannot  and  for  us,I  believe,  there  are  only  three  choices  open. 
The  first"is  to sit passively  in  the  face  of  a  recession which  has 
already  inflicted great  damage  on  our  societies,  and  which  is~ 
likely to  inflict much  more  if it lasts  much  longer.  The  second 
is effectively to  abandon  our  attempts  to  promote  the  free 
exchange  of  goods  and  services  and  return  - no  doubt  slowly  and 
without  openly  acknowledging  where  our  actions  are  leading  us  -
to the  beggar-my-neighbour  autarchy  of  the  19305.  The  third is 
to  recognise  that  the  vicious  circle of unemployment  and  ~ 
inflation can  be  cut  through  only at  a  continental  level  and  to 
find  a  way  of cutting  through  it at  the  level  of  the  European 
Community  as  a  whole. 
I  do  not  believe  that social  democracy  could  long  survive 
the  adoption  of  eit~er of  the first  two  choices.  To  allow 
the  present  level  of  unemployment  to  continue  indefinitely 
would  not  only  be  callous  and  inhumane,  it would  be  to proclaim 
that  the  mixed  economy  had  failed after all:  that  the  effective 
choice  for  humanity  did,  after all,  lie between  the  harsh  doctrines 
of  the  nineteenth century.  A  slow  and  unacknowledged  return 
to  autarchy,  though  less  obviously  damaging  in  the  short  run, 
/would,  I  believe. '  ' 
would,  I  believe,  be  equally destructive  in the  longer  term  -
destructive  to prosperity,  destructive  to  good  international 
relations,  destructive  to  the  Community  and  destructive 
eventually to  democracy  as  well. 
Only  the  third  choice,  in my  view,  remains;  and  there  is 
no  denying  that  the  third choice  entails  a  transfer of  power  from 
the national  to  the  Community  level.  It entails,  in  the  first 
place  a  firm  commitment  to  European  economic  monetary  union. 
At  present,  as  I  have  tried  to  show,  each  of  our  member  governments 
is  caught  in  a  straitjacket  in which  action  to stimulate  demand 
~ffectively and  therefore  in  the  longer  term,  is  ruled  out 
either by  fears  of a  fall  in  the  exchange  rate or by  the 
knowledge  that other  governments  cannot  stimulate  demand  because 
of their fears  of  a  fall  in  the  exchange  rate.  I  d~ not  claim 
that  full  employment  would  autmatically  follow  if these  exchange-
rate uncertainties  were  ended  by  monetary  union.  I  do  believe 
that  there  is  no  hope  of  returning  to  an  acceptable  employment 
level unless  they  are  ended:  and  I  see  no  prospect  of ending 
them  without  monetary  union.  Monetary  union  is not  a 
sufficient condition of  economic  recovery.  But  it is,  I  believe, 
a  necessary condition. 
Here  I  may  be  told that,  however  desirable it may  be  in 
principle,  monetary  union will not  work  unless  the  economies  of the 
Community  move  much  closer together,  and,  in particular,  unless 
the  richer economies  transfer  resources  to  the  poorer  on  a  scale 
which  is politically inconceivable:  that it would  mean 
turning  the  Community  into  a  federal  state:  and  that  federalis~ 
is not only  a  lost  cause  but  a  deservedly  lost  cause. 
like  to  comment  briefly on  both  these  criticisms. 
/It is It is  true  that monetary  union  requires  a 
coming-together  in economic  policy  on  the  part of our  member 
governments:  by  definition,  the  same  applies  to  any  attempt  to 
solve  our  problems  through  common  action.  But it is not  true 
that monetary union pre-supposes  equality of,  or  even  rapid 
convergence  in,  economic  performance.  If it were,  the monetary 
union  known  as  the  United  States  would  long  since have  fallen 
apart.  What  is essential  is that all  the parties to  the  union  -
stronger  and  weaker  alike  - should benefit  and  be  seen  to benefit. 
Provided  that  essential condition is met,  union  is consistent 
with wide  variations  in  living  standards  and productivity. 
That  condition is not  as  difficult to meet  as  is  sometimes 
supposed.  In particular,  I  do  no~ believe  that it will  require 
gigantic  transfers  of resources  from  the  strong  economies  to  the 
weak.  In  their  impressive  recent  report  on  the  role  of  the  public 
finance  in European  integration,  the  MacDougall  group  of 
economists  calculated that  European  monetary  union  might  be 
.. 
feasible  if the  Community  budget were·increased  so  as  to  account 
for  5  per cent  of total  Community  GNP  as  against  the  presen~ 
figure  of 0.7t  of  Community  GNP.  That  is  a  formidable  increase. 
_  .. 
It is not,  I  suggest,  over  a  period  a  politically inconceivable 
one.  At  5  pe~ cent  of Community  GNP  the  Community  budget  would 
of  course  be  far  smaller  in  its  impact  ~n the  economy  than  those 
of  th~ Member  States,  which  account  on  average  for  around 
40  per  cent  of  GNP.  It would  also  be  far  smaller than  those  of 
the  central  governments  of  most  federal  states, which  generally 
account  for  between  20  and  25  per cent.  Yet  a  5  per  cent  budget 
would  give  significant  and  tangible benefits  to  the  weaker 
economies  of the Community.  At  the  same  time  the  adYantages  to 
the  strong of  a  decisive underpinning  of  the  unity of  the  market 
h·:oulc would  be  very great.  This  is particularly so when  the 
necessary  and  indeed desirable,  but  in itself potentially 
loosening  element  of further  enlargement  of the  Community  is 
being  introduced.  It is  also particularly so  when  the  world 
competitive position of even  the  strongest  of  our  economies  is  less 
so  than it was  a  decade  ago. 
The  charge  that monetary  union  would  be  a  step  towards 
'federalism'. with  the  implication that anything  that  smacks 
of  'federalism'  is  ipso  facto  to  be  condemned,  is  in  some 
ways  more  difficult to  take  hold  of,  for  the  term  'federalism' 
is  as  imprecise  as  it is  highly-charged.  I  shall  therefore 
try to  stand  back  from  the  argument  a  little and  to discuss, 
as  dispassionately as  I  can,  what  seems  to  me  the  real 
institutional choices  facing  the  Community,  and  the  ways  1n 
which  monetary  union  would  bear  upon  those  choices. 
I  start with  the  obvious  - but  all too  ofte~ neglected  -
proposition that  the  Community's  system  of  government  is 
sui generis,  with  no  precedent  in history  and  no  parallel  e1Je1<'l-:-.:sre 
in  th~ world.  It is  not  remotely  a  federation,  if by 
'federation'  is meant  a  form  cif  government  akin  to  those .of  the 
United  States,  the  Dominic~ of  Canada,  or  for  that matter,  the 
Federal Republic  of  Germany.  The  Council  of Ministers  is not 
a  Senate  or  a  Bundesrat;  the  European  Parliament  is  not  a 
Congress,  and will not  be  one  even  after direct elections; 
the  European  Council  (of heads  of  government)  has  no  parallel 
in  any  federal  system.  Yet  the  Community  is certainly not 
simply  an  association  of  sovereign states,  joined  togetl'·-··:-
for strictly defined  and  limited purposes,  like  the  OECD 
NATO.  There  is  no  equivalent  to  the  Commission  or  the  EuroT·
0 
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Court  in  NATO  or  the  OECD,  but  Lhc  Co.  • on  and  che  Europt: 
/Co.c"t 
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Court  both play crucial parts in the  government  of  the 
Community.·  The  truth is that  the  Community  and  the  Community  methoc 
fit none  of  the  conventional  categories  of political analysis, 
and  that attempts  to  apply  conventional  categories  to  them  confuse 
more  than  they  illuminate. 
I  believe  that· this will  continue  to  be  the  case  for  the 
foreseeable  future.  Charles  Stewart  Parnell said:  "No  man 
can  set  a  limit to the  march  of  a  nation".  The  same  applies  to 
the  march  of  a  continent.  Subject  to  thit proviso,  there  is 
clearly little prospect  of  the  Community's  developing  into  a 
federal  state on  the  model  of  the  United States or  Federal 
Germany.  Nor  do  I  see  any  need  for it to  do  so.  -There are  too 
deeply  imbedded  national traditions.  The  really  important 
question now  facing  the  Community  and  its Member  States  is not 
whether  to  imitate  or  avoid  an  arbitrary model  of  federalism,  based 
on  American  or  German  experience.  It is how  and  to  whom  to 
re-apportion  the  functions  which  used  to  be  exercised by  the 
..  -. 
European  nation states,  but which  the  ~ 
European nation state can  no  longer  exercise effectively.  To 
insist  that  those  functions  can  only  be  apportioned either 
in  the  way  that  they  are  apportioned  in  the  Community  today,  or 
in  th~ way  that  they  are  apportioned-in  existing federal  systems, 
is  to  beg  this question  - and,  in  doing  so,  to  foreclose 
the  future  in  a  way  which  is  as  damaging  as  it is unimaginative. 
The  classical European  nation state is,  I  believe,  hoth 
too  small  and  too  big  for  all purposes.  It is  too  small  t0 
restore  full  employment  or  promote  economic  growth.  It is  too  big 
to satisfy the  growing  demand  f6r  cultural differentiation  and 
effective  popular  participation in  decision-making.  Some  of  its 
./functions functions  should  be  transferred upwards,  to the  Community., 
Others  can-be  transferred  downwards,  to provinces,  regions  or 
localities.  I  see  no  good  reason  why  both  these  needs  should 
not  be  met  at  the  same  time.  But  if we  are  to meet  them,  we 
' 
shall have  to devise  a  new  pattern of  government  in  the  Community, 
with  a  new  set of relationships  between  the  Community,  the 
national,  the  regional  and  the  local  levels.  No  satisfactory 
model  for  th~~·new pattern exists:  it will  have  to be  built 
·up gradually  through  trial and  error.  But  it is at  least clear 
that it will  have  to  be  a  European  pattern,  built  on  European 
precedents  to suit European  requirements.  It is equally clear 
that it will  have  to provide,  at  one  and  the  same  time,  much 
more  scope  for  initiative at  the  bottom,  and  much  speedier 
and  more  effective  decision-making at the  top,  than  are  to  be 
found  in the Community  at present 
That  means.,  I  believe, that it will  have  to be  .Huch  loo:scr 
and  more  de-centralised than  any  known  federal pattern.  But 
it also means  that it will  have  mofe  important  decisions 
in  common  than  is  the pattern of  Community  government  today .  .... 
Monetary  union,  in particular, will  entail  a  more  significant 
transfer of power  from  the ·national  to  the  Community  leve: 
than.ha..s been  carried outt  so  far.  In  a  monetary  union,  control 
over  the money supply  and  the  exchange  rate  - two  of  the  most 
prized weapons  in  the  armoury  of  the  modern  state  - would 
have  to  be  exercised  by  Community,  rather  than national, 
authorities.  New  Community  institutions would  have  to  be 
created,  and  a  new  Community  system  of  parliament~ry  co~t,·cl 
l-.'OUld  have m be  devised.  It is  true that,  from  the  ··~i.r,_t  ''! 
vie'"  of the Member  States,  the  powers  which  would  hav( 
transferred  to  the  Community  are,  iri  a  sense,  -illusor,'  -· 
I As  1  !; iVe 
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As  I  have  tried to show,  they  can  no  longer  be  exercised 
effectively at the national  level.  No  country,  as  our  own 
experience  between  1972  and  1976  showed  decisively,  can  go 
entirely its  own  way  in  these  mat~ers without  near disaster. 
We  did not  cure  unemployment  - on  the  contrary.  We  got 
inflation without  growth,  and  we  lost control  of  the  exchange 
rate.  Our  recovery'began  when,  partly by  necessity  and 
partly by  our  own  will,  we  accepted international disciplines. 
But  the--Community  is  large  enough  for  the  powers  exercised  at  this 
leveL-to_ be  real  and  not  illusorv.  There  can.  however.  be  :no-doubt 
that  the  transfer would  result 
1 in  an  important  change  in  the  existing relationship  between 
the  Community  and  the  Member  States . 
. .At  this point in  the  argument·.  a  ne'\·l  obiection  based  on 
posir.g  as.rea+ism.  · 
pessimism  f  obJeCtlon  1s  apt  to  make  itself heard.  Given  that 
European  union  is  a  good  thing  in principle,  it may  be  asked, 
given  that  a  mone  supranational  Community  would  be  a  good  thing 
if we  could get it, surely  the  history of  the  last  20  years 
'· 
proves  that  a  more  supranational' Community  is  a  pipe-draem?  We  arc  .. 
after all,  trying  to unite  ancient  and  deep-rooted nation 
states; with different  traditions  and  to  somG  extent 
different cultures.  Surel~,  in  these  circumstances,  it is 
hopelessly  impractical •to  try  to  go  much  further  than  we  have 
alre~dy gone?  That  being  so,  is  ther~ not  a  danger  that,  if 
we  try  and  forge  ahead,  we  shall merely  provoke  opposition 
which  might  otherwise  have  lain dormant,  and  end  by  doing 
more  harm  than  good? 
/In  one  form \. 
In  one  form  or another,  I  have  heard that  argument 
a  good  deal  in  the  last  12  months  - ev~n more  on  this 
side  of  the  Channel  than  on  the  other  - and 
it must  be  taken  seriously.  I  believe,  however,  that 
it rests  upon  two  profound misconceptions  - one  about  the 
present state of  the  Community  and  the  other  about  the nature 
of present-day European  society.  Let  me  deal with  each  of 
these  misconceptions  in turn. 
Implicit  in  the  whole  argument  is  an  assumption 
that  the  Conmunity  can  choose  between  moving  forward,  and 
·staying where  it is.  I  am  convinced  !  that  assumption  is 
false.  I  have  already pointed  to  the  danger  that,  if no 
solution is  found  to  the present  economic  crisis,  the weaker 
economies  may  slip backwards  into the  protectionism  of  40 
years  ago  and  impose  intolerable strains  on  the  Communitv  in 
doing  so.  That  problem  is  seriotis  cnougl1,  but  it is  only  one  of 
the  problems  facing  us  at  the  present  time.  There  is also  the 
problem of enlargemenswhich  I  h~~e already  mentioned  in 
passing:  a  Droblem  different  in  kind,  but  equal  in scale• 
Enlargement  is  unquestionably  a  political  imperative  for  the 
Community.  To  slam  the  door  on  the  newly  re-emerged  democracies 
of  s~uthern Europe  woul~ be  an  act  of' folly  as  well  as  of 
selfi~hness.  It would  put  the  surviva+  of free 
institutions  in  the  applicant  countries  at risk,  with 
incalculable  consequences  for  the  whole  of  the  Mediterranean 
region.  No  one  with the intero;t  of western  democracy  or  a  respect 
for  the essential political and  Europe-wide  purposes  "~  th~ 
Community  at  heat;  can  willingly contemplate  taking  tL  t  ·:  i  ~-
Yet  there  can  be  no  doubt  that if the  Community  is  en_. 
n inc  to  twe 1 vc  both  its  economic  and  its ins  t i tt·t  i anal  pr 
!idll be ..  .. 
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will be  exacerbated;  and  that if no  strengthening measures 
are  taken  in advance,  the  achievements  of the  past  20  years 
will  be  placed in  jeopardy.  They  can  be  solved if there  is  a 
will  to  solve  them.  But  they will be  solved only if the 
existing members  are prepared  to  move  forwards.  The  choice,  in 
other words,  does  no.t  lie between  moving  forward  and  staying 
where  we  are.  It lies between  moving  forward  and  moving  back. 
The  second misconception  goes  deeper.  It is true  that 
the nation states  of Europe  have  deep  roots,  ancient  traditions 
and,  in  some  respects,  proud histories.  It is also true that 
there  are  significant social  and  cultural differences  between 
them.  But  it does  not  follow  that  these  differences  are  so  great 
as  to  rule  out  a  firmer,  more  cohesive,  but  not  all-pervading, 
form  of_European union.  The  differences  are,  after all, no 
greater now  than  they were  when  the  foundations  of  the  Community 
were  laid.  If it were  possible for  France  and  Germany  to  merge 
their coal  and  steel  industries  o~ly seven  years  after the  third 
and  most  devastating war  between  them  in  less  than  a  century,  why  .. 
should it be  impossible  for nine  countries  which  have  been  at  peace 
with  each  other for  a  generation,  and  whose  old hatreds  have 
mellowed  beyond all recognition,  to move  towards  a  more  cohesive 
.. 
Community  than  they  have  so  far  created? 
The  argument  that progress  towards  a  more  cohesive 
Community  is  ruled  out  by  deep-seated differences  of culture 
and  tradition rests, it seems  to me,  on  an  unduly static and 
fatalistic conception  of political man.  It assumes  that  we 
are  prisoners  of  our histories,  that  our attitudes  are  fixed 
forever  in a  mould  set  by  the  past.  It underestimates  the  · 
capacity of ordinary men  and  women  to  learn  from  experience, 
to widen  their horizons,  to  recognise  that  new  circumstances 
/demand - 1  B  -
demand  new  approaches.  Above  all, it neglects  the  role 
of  leadership  in changing  old attitudes and  in helping 
create new  ones.  The  fact  that  the  European  Community  ~ists 
today  is, after all,  a  testimony  to  the  capacity of political 
leadership  to  change  attitudes  in  a  way  that would  have  been 
considered  impossibl~ before it happened.  The  present 
generation of European  political  leaders  cannot  afford  to 
fall  below  the  standards  set  by  the  last generation  in 
that  respect. 
This  stretch  of the  road  is not  easy.  The  institutional 
problems  are particularly formidable  and  will  test our 
ingenuity to  the  utmost. 
This,  linked as  it inextricably is with  the  problems  of 
unemployment  and  enlargement,  is  the  most  pressing  challenge 
which  social  democracy  now  faces  on  a  European  scale.  Direct 
elections  to the European  Parliament,  delayed  though  they 
are,  will at the  latest  take  place 1n  1979.  The 
campaigns  must  soon  be  planned.  For  the  first time  the  peQple  .. 
of Europe will  be  called upon  to make  a  choice  between  rivcl 
conceptions  of the  Community.  This  provides  a  major  opportuni~y 
to  confront its electors.with  the  options  now  facing  it, 
and  ,  in doing  so,  to create  a  genuinely  European  public 
opinion.  It will  be  a  contest which  breaks  new  ground.  I 
hope  that British social  democrats  play  their full  part  in it 
together with  the  continental socialist parties. 
oooOOOooo 
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